



Economic Injury to Aliens
in the Revised Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law
The American Law Institute (ALl) approved the Restatement of the
Law: Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) (Revised
Restatement; Restatement) in May 1986. The ALI is to be commended
for a generally creditable treatment of economic injury to aliens. While
the text omits some pertinent issues altogether and deals inadequately
with others, the Revised Restatement, by and large, upholds the essentials
of the traditional and established principles, processes, and objectives of
this aspect of international law.
Three years ago, such a relatively felicitous outcome seemed problem-
atic. The early drafts of the portion of the Restatement dealing with
economic injury to aliens suggested that the traditional law might have
been undermined by positions that had been advanced in political fora
during the mid-1970s by governments of many developing nations under
the slogans of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and per-
manent sovereignty over natural resources. These positions had never
gained sufficient acceptance in the international community to be consid-
ered as customary law, had been ignored in numerous bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements, and had been rejected by arbitral tribunals.
Nevertheless, the Reporters allowed some of these challenges mounted
against existing international legal norms to affect their initial product
substantially.
*Partner, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. Mr. Clagett represents, inter alia, the
claimants in Amoco Iran Oil Co. v. Iran and Amoco Int'l Finance Corp. v. Iran, cases 55
and 56, respectively, before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
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Specifically, the version of section 712 contained in Tentative Draft
No. 3 of the Revised Restatement appeared to depart quite radically from
established principles, both in what it said and what it left unsaid. The
position initially proposed by the Reporters reflected a flawed view of the
manner in which international law evolves, and in particular, of the weight
to which resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly are entitled
in that process.
This proposed position was vigorously opposed by many members of
the American Law Institute, in whose view the principles of international
law relating to expropriation had not substantially changed-and indeed
had been confirmed and strengthened-in the generation since the drafting
of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (Original Restatement).' The debate was joined by the Legal Ad-
viser of the State Department, the American Bar Association, the Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation, and others. As it happened, while
this debate was going on, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal-with
a highly respected membership and the broadest jurisdiction and most
active docket of any international court for decades-handed down a
series of decisions that squarely confirmed the traditional law of
expropriation.
Ultimately, the Reporters made substantial modifications in section 712.
As finally approved by the ALT, the provisions of the Revised Restatement
relating to economic injury turned out to be quite similar in substance to
the corresponding sections in the Original Restatement. The product does
not always compare favorably to its predecessor-in some respects the
Original Restatement was better organized and more comprehensive-
but it serves its purpose fairly well.
I. The Evolution of International Law
Much of the controversy surrounding Section 712 stemmed ultimately
from differences between the Reporters and their critics as to how inter-
I. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1965) [hereinafter ORIGINAL RESTATEMENT]. The Restatement (Second) was in fact the
first restatement on that subject. Both the Original and Revised Restatements " 'represent[ I
the opinion of the American Law Institute as to the rules that an international tribunal would
apply if charged with deciding a controversy under international law.' " RESTATEMENT OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED), introduction at I (Tent.
Final Draft, July 15, 1985) [hereinafter REVISED RESTATEMENT].
For criticisms of the early drafts of § 712, see, e.g., Clagett. Protection of Foreign In-
vestment Under the Revised Restatement, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 73 (1984); Houck, Restatement
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised): Issues and Resolutions, 20
INT'L Law. 1361, 1375-76 (1986); Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 176 (1984).
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national law is made. The draft Revised Restatement retreated from the
well-established rules set forth in the Original Restatement with regard
to the just-compensation standard for property expropriated from foreign
nationals. This change in large part reflected the great weight that the
Reporters initially attributed to resolutions of the General Assembly of
the United Nations. In the 1970s, the governments of many developing
states used General Assembly resolutions to press vigorously for a New
International Economic Order that they claimed would redress the pov-
erty that they attributed to their colonial heritage.
2
The 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States represented
the high-water mark of the developing states' challenge to the customary
international law ofjust compensation for expropriated assets. It provided
that, in cases of expropriation, the expropriating state "should" pay "ap-
propriate compensation," and that controversies caused by the question
of compensation "shall be settled under the domestic law of the nation-
alizing State," absent other, freely chosen, peaceful means. 3 The use of
the word "should," instead of "shall" or "must," in the Charter insin-
uated that the payment of just compensation was optional rather than
obligatory, while the provision that compensation controversies "shall"
be resolved under the expropriating state's domestic law represented a
radical departure from the long-standing principle that such controversies
present international law issues subject to international remedies. 4
General Assembly resolutions are not lawmaking instruments. 5 They
neither replace contradictory norms of customary international law nor
create new norms. They can be evidence that a new legal rule has emerged
only if they command virtually universal support. General Assembly Res-
olution 1803,6 adopted in 1962, which required the payment of appropriate
compensation in accordance with international law, is the most recent
resolution on expropriation to command the support of all the major
2. See, e.g., Gamble & Frankowska, International Law's Response to the New Inter-
national Economic Order: An Overview, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 257, 265-68 (1986).
3. United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Dec. 12, 1974), 14
I.L.M. 251, 255 (1975).
4. Gamble & Frankowska, supra note 2, at 265-68.
5. See, e.g., Suy, Innovations in International Law-Making Processes, in THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 187, 190 (R. MacDonald, D. Johnston
& G. Morris eds. 1978) (General Assembly resolutions "are mere recommendations having
no legally binding force for member states").
6. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962), reprinted in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 710 (1963), 2
I.L.M. 223 (1963). The United States made it clear that its vote in favor of this resolution
was based on the position that "appropriate" compensation means the same thing as prompt,
adequate, and effective (and therefore just) compensation. See Schwebel, The Story of the
U.N.'s Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463
(1961).
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groups of states. As such, this resolution expressed widely accepted prin-
ciples of international law and state practice.
Although the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was
passed by a majority of 120 to six, with ten abstentions, the absence from
the majority of the major capital-exporting states (including the United
States, Japan, and much of Western Europe) robbed the measure of any
pretense to the general acceptance as a rule of law that is required to
create or to alter an international law rule. 7
Changes in political and economic circumstances in the developing
world in the past decade have brought a warmer welcome toward foreign
investment. 8 OPEC's example in the mid-1970s raised hopes throughout
the developing world that the principal investing nations could be com-
pelled to accept less security for their investments because of the en-
hanced bargaining leverage expected by the governments of many
developing countries. By the early 1980s, depressed commodity prices,
lack of investment, and the waning power of OPEC deflated these hopes.
These changed circumstances renewed acceptance in the developing
world of the need for fair and stable rules in order to induce foreign
investment. As a result, developing nations have continued to accept-
indeed, more frequently than ever before-clauses providing for tradi-
tional standards of just compensation in bilateral and multilateral invest-
ment agreements. 9 This illustrates the continuing validity of those rules,
as well as one reason why ephemeral political resolutions should not be
facilely regarded as changing the law. As the Reporters say in a note to
section 103 of the Revised Restatement, "Evidence of International Law":
A resolution purporting to state the law on a subject is some evidence of what
the states voting for the resolution regard the law to be, although what states
do is more weighty evidence than their declarations or the resolutions they vote
for ....
... [M]ajorities may be tempted to declare as existing law what they would
like the law to be, and less weight must be given to such a resolution when it
declares law in the interest of the majority and against the interest of a strongly
dissenting minority. 10
7. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, reprinted in S. ROSENNE, Doc-
UMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 59, 78-79 (1979). Under art. 38(l)(b),
customary international law results only from "a general practice accepted as law." (Em-
phasis added.)
8. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
10. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 103 reporters' note 2. The text approved in substance by
the ALl was subject to nonsubstantive editing. References to the Revised Restatement that
appear in this article (other than those identified as taken from earlier drafts) refer to a
marked-up version that was sent to the authors by the ALl in April 1987. Quotations from
the Revised Restatement that appear in the article may be subject to further nonsubstantive
revision prior to final publication.
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11. Omissions in the Revised Restatement
The Revised Restatement includes far fewer comments and illustrations
than the Original Restatement. This contraction-which often results in
a regrettable lack of precision-constitutes the principal omission in the
Revised Restatement; nearly all of the black-letter rules from the Original
Restatement can be found dispersed among black letter, comment, and
Reporters' notes to section 712 of the Revised Restatement. The defini-
tions of "property" and "taking" provided in sections 191 and 192 of the
Original Restatement have no precise analogue in the Revised Restate-
ment, but various comments and notes to the Revised Restatement give
substantial meaning to the terms. The other black-letter omissions carry
little significance. 11
The evolution of § 712 from tentative draft to final text parallels an evolution in the
Reporters' treatment of the subject of the derivation of international law in §§ 102 (sources
of international law) and 103 (evidence of international law). The Reporters' overemphasis
on U.N. General Assembly resolutions in the initial drafts of§ 712 reflected an overemphasis
in §§ 102 and 103 on the importance of such resolutions in the creation of international law.
For example, Tentative Draft No. I of § 103 accorded "substantial weight" to resolutions
of international organizations as "important evidence" of international law and "strong
evidence of what the states voting for it regard as the state of the law." The Reporters
contended that nonbinding resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly had legal significance,
adding that continued reaffirmation by overwhelming majority of a General Assembly res-
olution strength-ns the evidence that the resolution constitutes a rule of international law.
REVISED RESTATEMENT § 103 comment c & reporters' note 2 (Tent. Draft No. I, April I,
1980).
Much of this language was deleted or softened in the final Revised Restatement, which
concluded in new language that:
Even a unanimous resolution may be questioned when the record shows that those voting
for it considered it merely a recommendation or a political expression, or that serious
consideration was not given to its legal basis. A resolution is entitled to little weight if it
is contradicted by state practice . . . or is rejected by international courts or tribunals.
REVISED RESTATEMENT § 103 reporters' note 2. In addition, the Reporters retained their
statement that "what states do is more weighty evidence than their declarations or the
resolutions they vote for." Id.
Thus, the ALl was consistent in the changes it introduced in §§ 102, 103, and § 712. For
further discussion of the evolution of international law, see Charney, International Agree-
ments and the Development of Customary International Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971 (1986);
Sohn, 'Generally Accepted' International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073 (1986).
II. The Original Restatement also included a rule that a taking is wrongful under inter-
national law if the property is merely in transit through a state's territory or is temporarily
subject to that state's jurisdiction, and is not required by the state because of serious
emergency. ORIGINAL RESTATEMENT § 185. The Revised Restatement omits that rule. Sec-
tion 196 of the Original Restatement also has no equivalent in the Revised Restatement.
Section 196 provided that it is wrongful under international law to forbid an alien to engage
in previously lawful gainful activity unless the alien is given reasonable notice and oppor-
tunity to pursue other gainful activities or to leave the state, or the prohibition does not
discriminate against aliens and is based upon bona fide reasons of public policy, or there is
reasonable provision for the determination and payment of just compensation. The subject
is mentioned only in a treaty context in § 712, which refers in Reporters' Note 12 to the
"network of bilateral international agreements that (provide for extensive rights for the
nationals of one state party within the territory of the other."
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III. Property Rights and the Restatements
According to both Restatements-Original and Revised-international
law requires that, if a state takes a property interest of an alien, or in
some cases, breaches or repudiates the contract rights of an alien, then
the expropriating state must compensate the alien for the full value of the
expropriated property interest or repudiated contract rights. Under the
Original Restatement, the law as related to the taking of property was set
forth in eight black-letter rules (sections 185-92), and the law relating to
breach of contract and prohibition of gainful activities was set forth in
four black-letter rules (sections 193-96). The Revised Restatement con-
denses these twelve rules into one: section 712, entitled "Economic Injury
to Nationals of Other States."
A. "JUST COMPENSATION" AND TAKINGS OF PROPERTY
Section 712(1) of the Revised Restatement provides:
A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from:
(1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of another state
that is
(a) not for a public purpose, or
(b) is [sic] discriminatory, or
(c) is [sic] not accompanied by provision for just compensation;
For compensation to be just under this subsection, it must, in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, be in an amount equivalent to
the value of the property taken and be paid at the time of taking, or
within a reasonable time thereafter with interest from the date of taking,
and in a form economically usable by the foreign national. 12
This formula expresses a compressed but fairly accurate statement of
international law.
1. The Basic Rules Reaffirmed
Tentative Draft No. 3 of the Revised Restatement observed that the
traditional rules on expropriation had been challenged by many states,
but continued to be valid in "the view of the United States Government
and of other developed states." 13 This language completely ducked the
question whether the ALl believed that that view remained a correct
statement of international law or not. In the final version, the ambiguity
12. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712(l). For subsections (2) and (3), see infra notes 48-77
and accompanying text.
13. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 comment b (Tent. Draft No. 3, Mar. 15, 1982).
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was resolved by the expanded black letter, and in addition, by the state-
ment in Comment b that, although the traditional rules have been chal-
lenged, "this Restatement reaffirms that they continue to be valid and
effective principles of international law."
The black letter of section 712 in Tentative Draft No. 3 referred to "just
compensation" without giving it any content. The last sentence of the
final section 712(1), quoted above, corrected that crucial omission.
The black letter of section 712 requires that a state is responsible under
international law for a taking "not accompanied by provision for just
compensation .... " (Emphasis added.) A narrow reading of this lan-
guage could lead to the conclusion that an unfulfilled provision for just
compensation would be sufficient for a state to avoid international re-
sponsibility. Comment b, however, makes it clear that "international law
requires that when foreign properties are expropriated there must be
compensation and such compensation must be just." Comment d adds
that for compensation to be just it "must be paid at the time of taking or
with interest from that date . . . " These statements leave no doubt that
just compensation must be paid. The point was spelled out in black letter
in the Original Restatement.
14
The last sentence of section 712(l) sets forth, though not in so many
words, the traditional and still-valid rule that, in order to be just, the
compensation must be "prompt, adequate and effective." The Chief Re-
porter for the Revised Restatement, Professor Louis Henkin, declared at
an early stage of the debate that the Reporters had refused to insert the
"prompt, adequate and effective" formula as black letter "because we
[Reporters] do not think that that can be said as an honest statement of
customary international law."1 5
The ALI decided otherwise. The final version of section 712, while still
avoiding those three words, supplies in black letter and comment all of
their substance. Take the traditional rule of "adequacy" of compensation,
according to which the compensation must be in an amount equivalent
to the full value of the expropriated property or property interest. 16 Many
recent decisions by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal have upheld
14. ORIGINAL RESTATEMENT § 186.
15. 59th Annual Meeting, ALl PROC. 238-39 (1982).
16. Under international law, legal and beneficial interests in property short of full own-
ership thereof are also protected from takings. Property also includes contract rights, as is
recognized by the Revised Restatement, which states that the rules as to property takings
1'generally apply" if a government should cancel a long-term concession agreement to
operate a mine. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 reporters' note 10(c) (rights under concession
contracts have been treated as property subject to expropriation).
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this principle. 17 Courts in many nations, including some in the developing
world, have also insisted that expropriated property be compensated at
its full, going-concern value. The Supreme Court of India has held that
the term "compensation" itself, as it appeared in article 31(2) of the
Constitution of India, incorporated the concepts of equivalence and going-
concern value:
In its dictionary meaning "compensation" means anything given to make things
equal in value: anything given as an equivalent, to make amends for loss or
damage. In all States where the rule of law prevails, the right to compensation
is guaranteed by the Constitution or regarded as inextricably involved in the
right to property. 18
Compensation being the equivalent in terms of money of the property com-
pulsorily acquired, the principle for determination of compensation is intended
to award to the expropriated owner the value of the property acquired. 19
The broad object underlying the principle of valuation is to award to the
owner the equivalent of his property with its existing advantages and its po-
tentialities. Where there is an established market for the property acquired the
problem of valuation presents little difficulty. Where there is no established
market for the property, the object of the principle of valuation must be to pay
to the owner for what he has lost, including the benefit of advantages present
as well as future. 20
Although the Revised Restatement eschews the word "adequate," it
states that, absent "exceptional circumstances," 21 "compensation to be
just ... must ... be ... equivalent to the value of the property taken." 22
Indeed, that language is more explicit than the single word "adequate,"
and is identical to it in content as that word has been consistently applied
by its originator, the United States Government.
Similarly, while section 712 does not use the word "prompt," the black
letter declares that compensation must be paid "at the time of the taking,
17. Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 298-317-1 (Apr. 22, 1987); SEDCO, Inc. v. NIOC,
Award No. ITL 55-129-3 (Oct. 27, 1985); Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-
AFFA Consulting Eng'rs of Iran, Award No. 141-7-2 (June 29, 1984), 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R.
219; American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 93-2-3 (Dec. 19, 1983), 4 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 96; Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 32-24-1 (Dec. 19,
1983). 4 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 122; Dames & Moore v. Iran, Award No. 97-54-3 (Dec. 20, 1983),
4 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 212. See Brower, Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation
and Compensation: A Preliminary Survey of Awards of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, 21 INT'L LAW. 639, 658-64 (1987). The sole exception is gratuitous and ill-sup-
ported dicta in INA Corp. v. Iran, Award 1841-161-1 (Aug. 13, 1985), and in the separate
opinion of Judge Lagergren, suggesting that, in cases of large-scale nationalizations of entire
industries, a standard of less than full value might be appropriate.
18. R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, 1970 A.I.R. 564, 605 (S. Ct. India).
19. Id. at 609.
20. Id; accord Jarjees v. President of Egypt, Case No. 39, S. Const. Ct., Egypt, June 21,
1986.
21. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712().
22. Id. The issue of how that value is determined will be examined infra notes 30-33 and
accompanying text.
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or within a reasonable time thereafter with interest from the date of
taking."23 It would have been preferable had the term "interest" been
modified by a phrase such as "at a fair market rate," but in context that
can fairly be taken as implicit. Thus the Revised Restatement conforms
to the international standard of promptness.
Finally, section 712(1) provides that compensation must be in a form
economically usable by the foreign national, and Comment d adds that
"[clompensation should be in convertible currency without restriction on
repatriation, but payment in bonds may satisfy the requirement of just
compensation if they bear interest at an economically reasonable rate and
if there is a market for them through which their equivalent in convertible
currency can be realized." This formula states well, and very explicitly,
the substance of the rule that compensation to be just must be "effective."
2. Exceptional Circumstances
In one respect, however, section 712 opens the possibility for compen-
sation occasionally to be considered just even when it is not prompt,
adequate, and effective. It does so by stating in Comment d that "[i]n
exceptional circumstances, some deviation from the standard of compen-
sation set forth in subsection (!) might satisfy the requirement of just
compensation." 24 What might constitute such "exceptional circum-
stances"? The Restatement does not attempt an affirmative definition.
Without one, the meaning of "exceptional circumstances" will remain
elusive.
The Restatement does provide, in Comment d, a pair of examples to
illustrate possible "exceptional circumstances." One is the taking of alien
property during war or similar exigency; the other is the taking of land
in furtherance of national programs of agricultural-land reform. The Re-
porters hedge these examples, however, saying only that they "might"
permit deviation from the just-compensation standard. In the case of
agricultural reform, the Reporters note that no international tribunal has
authoritatively passed upon the question.
After sketchily suggesting what circumstances might be exceptional,
the Restatement goes on to clarify what circumstances clearly are not. It
23. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712(); see also id. comment d.
24. Comment d earlier states that, "in the absence of exceptional circumstances, com-
pensation to be just must be equivalent to the value of the property taken and must be paid
at the time of taking or with interest from that date and in an economically useful form."
The sentence should have included the words "at least," so as to read "at least in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, compensation to be just must be ...." This addition
would have been consistent with the rest of Comment d, which is entirely noncommittal
about whether there can ever be "exceptional circumstances" that warrant a departure
from the standard of full compensation.
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notes the following instances in which a departure from the general rule
of just compensation on the ground of "exceptional circumstances" is
always unwarranted:
(a) the property taken had been used in a business enterprise that was specif-
ically authorized or encouraged by the state; (b) the property was an enterprise
taken for operation as a going concern by the state; (c) the taking program did
not apply equally to nationals of the taking state; or (d) the taking itself was
otherwise wrongful under subsection (1)(a) or (b) [of Section 712].25
These four exceptions parallel the Original Restatement, which pro-
vided that "[u]nder ordinary conditions" the amount of compensation in
order to be adequate "must be equivalent to the full value of the property
taken, together with interest to the date of payment." 26 It then defined
"ordinary conditions" as including, at least, the same four circumstances
that are described in the Revised Restatement as for being exceptional
circumstances that would permit compensation for less than the full value
of the property taken. A comment to the Original Restatement provision
stated (accurately) that these four categories "cover the great majority
of cases that are likely to give rise to international claims."' 27 The sub-
stance of the Revised Restatement is identical to that of the Original
Restatement.
The two examples the Reporters suggest as possible exceptions to the
rule of full value in adequacy of compensation are far from settled. While
it is clearly permissible for a state to take alien property during time of
war without a legal obligation to make prompt compensation, it is far less
clear what is the taking state's ultimate legal obligation in respect of just
compensation under international law. 28 Similarly, national programs of
agricultural land reform may certainly be undertaken, but no international
25. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 comment d.
26. ORIGINAL RESTATEMENT § 188.
27. Id. comment a.
28. The legality under international law of a wartime taking depends on the relative status
of the taking state (invader, defender, occupant) and the injured alien (resident, nonresident;
belligerent, neutral, ally), the situs of the seized property (high seas, battlefield, enemy
territory), its ownership (public, private) and character (weapons, vehicles, food, jewelry),
and other factors. In his treatise on international conflict, Julius Stone lamented that the
legal impact of a war upon enemy property "is governed by an unwieldy variety of rules
dependent on a bewildering number of factors." J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTER-
NATIONAL CONFLICT 434 (2d imp. rev. 1959). Stone noted a shift away from simple confis-
cation of enemy private property, but concluded that "the question whether enemy assets
seized should be paid for some time or other becomes relatively trivial" vis-a-vis the avail-
ability of use of such assets during a conflict. Id. at 436. In an occupied territory, private
personal property that is necessary to maintain an army though not military in nature (e.g.,
cloth for uniforms, food) may only be taken if actually required, duly requisitioned, and
paid for by the occupying army. Id. at 706-07 (citing Laws and Customs of War on Land
(Hague, IV), Oct. 18, 1907, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365).
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tribunal has ever held that an extensive program of such takings excuses
a state from the obligation to pay full compensation. The better view is
that the fact that such takings would entail a heavy burden to the expro-
priating state, since they produce no state income-the rationale usually
given for the alleged exception 29-cannot defeat accepted international
legal rules concerning just compensation. No adequate reason appears
why a foreign owner, whose investment was lawful when made, should
be penalized because a state wishes to carry out social-reform projects-
whether dealing with agricultural land or anything else-and would prefer
to avoid paying for them.
3. Illusory Distinctions Implied by Semantic Differences
Comment c to section 712 supports the view that compensation must
be "just," after noting that "authoritative declarations" exist under in-
ternational law that the compensation to be paid must be "appropriate."
The comment then distinguishes between the view of the Revised Re-
statement and the view of the United States Government: the latter is
described as having consistently taken the position that, under interna-
tional law, compensation must be "prompt, adequate, and effective." The
comment adds that this formulation has been strongly resisted by devel-
oping states and has not been incorporated into multilateral agreements
or universally utilized by international tribunals.
Thus the various characterizations of the required compensation as
"appropriate," "just," or "prompt, adequate, and effective" are made
to appear as possibly in conflict. The implication created by distinguishing
among the "authoritative declarations," the Restatement, and the United
States Government as espousers of each of these standards implies that
there are differences among them. But surely the key question is the
substance of the legal standard, not the label attached to it. The Revised
Restatement gives no reason to conclude that these different labels reflect
any difference in legal standards. Thus, as has been shown, just com-
pensation is defined in the black letter and Comment d of section 712 in
a manner indistinguishable from the definition of prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation contained in the Original Restatement and es-
poused for the past fifty years by the United States Government. 30
29. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 reporters' note 3.
30. Secretary of State Cordell Hull made the classic statement of this position. Relying
on authoritative decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice and other inter-
national arbitral tribunals, Secretary Hull declared that existing principles of international
law entitled United States nationals to "prompt, adequate, and effective payment" for the
expropriation of their property and property interests in Mexico. 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655, 658-59 (1942).
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The United States' position is that "appropriate compensation" means
the same thing as "just compensation." Clearly, there is nothing inherent
in the term "appropriate compensation" that prevents a court from con-
cluding that full compensation is required. Indeed, the use of the term
"appropriate compensation" should compel the court to conclude that
full compensation is-required; how can anything less than full compen-
sation be either appropriate or compensatory? Although some may view
the term as a watering down of the just-compensation formula, it is not.
At worst it is arguably vaguer than the traditional formulations, though
in fact all three are somewhat vague until content is supplied by definition,
as is done in the last sentence of section 712(l). Once that sentence was
added, Comment c should have been changed, for it makes no sense to
contrast "just" with "prompt, adequate and effective" when the Re-
statement defines "just" precisely as meeting the substance of the latter
standard.
The view that "appropriate" and "just" compensation are synonymous
terms has received very recent support from the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal. In Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran the Tribunal analyzed the meaning of
"appropriate" compensation under international law. The Tribunal noted
that "much of the debate that has divided the respective protagonists of
terms such as 'prompt, adequate and effective,' 'fair,' 'just' or 'appro-
priate' compensation has been conducted at a theoretical level." 3' After
discussing such sources as UN General Assembly resolutions, the recent
Seoul Declaration on the NIEO, 32 and recent arbitral and judicial prec-
edent, the Tribunal declared that "appropriate compensation" is equiv-
alent to the "full value of the property in the circumstances." '33
4. Creeping Expropriation
Since there are numerous ways in which an acquisitive state can achieve
the result of depriving a foreign national of the benefit or use of his
property, section 712 recognizes that international responsibility extends
not only to formal or avowed expropriations, but also to other actions of
a state "that have the effect of 'taking' the property, in whole or in large
part, outright or in stages .... ,,34 Initially, the Reporters described what
is often called "creeping" expropriation more narrowly:
31. Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran, supra note 17, at 16.
32. Seoul Declaration on the Progressive Development of Principles of Public Interna-
tional Law Relating to a New International Economic Order, International Law Association,
30 August 1986 5.5 [hereinafter Seoul Declaration].
33. Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran, supra note 17, at 17.
34. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 comment g.
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A state is responsible as for an expropriation of property under Subsection (I)
[of Section 712] when it subjects alien property to taxation or regulation that
is confiscatory, or that prevents, unreasonably interferes with, or unduly delays,
effective enjoyment of an alien's property or its removal from the state's
territory.35
This list of types of conduct that can amount to creeping expropriation
was incomplete. For instance, the failure to control illegal actions of local
political units or other groups acting under the direction or control, or
with the approval, of governmental authorities might not have constituted
creeping expropriation under this definition. Ultimately, the Revised Re-
statement adopted a broader approach, by extending the illustrations of
creeping expropriation to include "other action that is confiscatory, or
that prevents, unreasonably interferes with, or unduly delays, effective
enjoyment of an alien property or its removal from the state's territory."
(Emphasis added.) This formulation adequately covers the range of pos-
sibly expropriatory actions.
5. Just Compensation in International
Practice and Jurisprudence
Reporters' Note No. 1 (which does not purport to represent the opinion
of the AL136) declares that "[s]ince 1974, the controversy as to the state
of customary law [in respect of the standard of compensation] has been
dormant .... ,,37 That statement is hardly accurate. To the contrary, an
extensive body of literature on the subject has been published since 1974,
while arbitral tribunals, including the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,
have addressed the issue thoroughly. 38
35. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 comment g (Tent. Draft No. 3, Mar. 15, 1982).
36. Under established ALl practice, the Institute is responsible only for the content of
the black letter and comments of a restatement; the Reporters' Notes are the responsibility
of the Reporters only. REVISED RESTATEMENT iX.
37. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 reporters' note I.
38. See, e.g., merely as a sampling of a very rich body of both literature and case law:
A. AKINSANYA, THE EXPROPRIATION OF MULTINATIONAL PROPERTY IN THE THIRD WORLD
(1980); J.-P. LAVIEC, PROTECTION ET PROMOTION DES INVESTISSEMENTS (1985); 4 THE
VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Lillich ed. 1987);.
M. SORNARAJAH, THE PURSUIT OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY (1986); Carroll, Creating a
Framework for the Re-introduction of International Law to Controversies Over Compen-
sation for Expropriation of Foreign Investments, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 163 (1982);
Francioni, Compensation for Nationalisation of Foreign Property: The Borderland Between
Law and Equity, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 255 (1975); Gann, Compensation Standard for
Expropriation, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 615 (1985); Garcia-Amador, The Proposed
New International Economic Order; A New Approach to the Law Governing Nationalization
and Compensation, 12 LAW. AM. I (1980); Hu, Compensation in Expropriations: A Pre-
liminary Economic Analysis, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 61 (1979); Lapres, Principles of Compen-
sation for Nationalised Property, 26 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 97 (1977); Mendelson, Compensation
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If the Reporters are referring to policy statements related to the standard
of compensation, the silence from the United Nations since the 1974
passage of the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States is indeed
significant. 39 Traditionally, General Assembly resolutions that continue
to enjoy a broad measure of support are passed year after year, but the
Charter and similar resolutions have not been repeated since 1974.40 That
fact tends to confirm the conclusion that the Charter does not enjoy the
general acceptance required to create a rule of international law.
Indeed, there is substantial evidence that the governments of many
developing nations have decided that it is in their best interests to accept
the customary international legal requirement of just compensation, in
order to induce investment in their territories and also, in some instances,
to protect investment that they themselves make in other countries. It is
clear that an investor is far less likely to finance a project in a country
that asserts the right to set its own standards of compensation for expro-
priated property than in a country that respects property rights and in-
ternational remedies.
for Expropriation: The Case Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 414 (1985); Mendelson, Correspon-
dence, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1041 (1985); Muller, Compensation for Nationalization: A North-
South Dialogue, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 35 (1981); Nagpal, What Is Just Compen-
sation?, 17 J. INDIAN L. INST. 131 (1975); Neville, The Present Status of Compensation by
Foreign States for the Taking of Alien-owned Property, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51
(1980); Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 176 (1984);
Rood, Compensation for Takeovers in Africa, I I J. INT'L L. & ECON. 521 (1977); Schachter,
Compensation Cases-Leading and Misleading, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 420 (1985); Schachter,
Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1984); Sornarajah, Compensation
for Expropriation: The Emergence of New Standards, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 108 (1979);
Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of
Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 437 (1981); Comment, The International Law
of Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Property: The Compensation Requirement and the Role
of the Taking State, 6 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 355 (1983); Comment, International
Law: An "Appropriate" Compensation Standard for Nationalized Property, 66 MINN. L.
REV. 931 (1982); decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal cited supra note 17;
BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 297 (Lagergren, Arb. 1974): Texas
Overseas Petroleum Co. (TOPCO) v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. I (Dupuy, Arb. 1977); Libyan Am.
Oil Co. (L1AMCO) v. Libya, 20 I.L.M. I (Mahmassani, Arb. 1977); Benvenuti et Bonfant
v. Peoples Republic of the Congo, 21 I.L.M. 740 (1980); Kuwait v. American Indep. Oil Co.
(Aminoil), 66 I.L.R. 518 (Reuter, Sultan, Fitzmaurice, Arbs. 1982).
39. In their overview of international law and the New International Economic Order,
Gamble and Frankowska cite only one NIEO document subsequent to the Charter-the
1975 Lima Declaration-which suggested that foreign-owned property may be nationalized
without also mentioning an international legal standard of compensation. Gamble & Fran-
kowska, supra note 2, at 268-74 (citing United National Industrial Development Organi-
zation: Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation
(Mar. 26, 1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 826 (1975)).
40. See J. EssER & K. MEESSEN, KAPITALINVESTITIONEN IM AUSLAND-CHANCEN UND
RISIKEN 21 (1983).
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It is in this context that a worldwide network of bilateral and multilateral
investment treaties and other commitments across a broad spectrum of
states (including many of those that voted for the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States and other General Assembly resolutions) have
recognized and reaffirmed the full-compensation standard. As of Decem-
ber 1984, approximately 215 bilateral investment treaties were in force, 4'
reflecting a very large increase during the preceding decade. The great
majority of these treaties "restate the 'prompt, adequate and effective'
standard or a reasonable approximation." 42 Nearly 100 states are parties
to such treaties, including dozens of states of the developing world.43
The Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee has prepared three
model drafts for bilateral investment-protection agreements, which "con-
sidered the need for working out appropriate norms for promotion and
protection of investments on a bilateral basis so as to facilitate investments
being made in the developing countries in the region." Two of the three
41. Niinisalo, Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties: Their Nature and Role in the
Development of International Expropriation Law 38 (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Harvard
Law School, 1985).
42. Gudgeon, Valuation of Nationalized Property Under United States and Other Bilateral
Investment Treaties, in 4 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 101, 113-14 (R. Lillich ed. 1987).
The non-U.S. BITs [bilateral investment treaties] provide that a lawful taking must be
accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective compensation, or ready equivalents, in
60 of the 90 treaties reviewed .... In most other treaties, language regarding promptness
and effective and transferable compensation appears. The failure to recite the entire
incorporative "prompt, adequate and effective" formulation or an equivalent .... thus
stating also a general compensation standard, is arguably irrelevant where there is a clear
requirement for market valuation; (see, e.g., France-Singapore, art. 4, "without undue
delay," free transferability, "commercial value of assets"; no interest requirement). Gen-
eral international law references, discussed below, are probably considered by their draft-
ers to substitute for the prompt, adequate and effective phrase, but they frequently appear
in tandem as in the U.S. treaties. Many non-U.S. treaties that do employ a "prompt,
adequate and effective" formulation or the equivalent are also reinforced, just like the
U.S. treaties, by additional language on promptness and effectiveness/transferability, and
refer to a market theory of valuation as well.
Interestingly, of 35 reviewed non-U.S. treaties signed in the past four years, 25 have
used the prompt, adequate and effective formulation or a close equivalent. Note in par-
ticular that this prompt, adequate and effective formulation has been used in such intra-
LDC treaties and BITs with socialist countries as the Rumania-Sri Lanka BIT, art. 6; Sri
Lanka-Korea, art. 7; Singapore-Sri Lanka, art. 6; and Sweden-Yugoslavia, art. 3.
Id. at 114 (footnotes omitted).
43. For details, see, e.g., Clagett, Just Compensation in International Law: The Issues
Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, in 4 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED
PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31, n.164 (R. Lillich ed. 1987). In addition, at least 87
states have signed and ratified the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (the ICSID
Convention), and more than 200 ICSID clauses in investment agreements are known to the
ICSID Secretariat. Id. A number of multilateral and regional conventions also contain
investment-protection provisions. Clagett, supra, n.174.
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model treaties developed by the group expressly provide for "prompt,
adequate and effective compensation." 44
The International Law Association's 1986 Seoul Declaration on the
Progressive Development of Principles of Public International Law, in the
drafting of which lawyers and officials from many developing states par-
ticipated, provides that the principle of permanent sovereignty over nat-
ural resources applies "without exempting the state from the application
of the relevant principles and rules of international law." 45 It further states
that expropriation must be for a public purpose and nondiscriminatory,46
and that expropriation is subject to "appropriate compensation as required
by international law and to any applicable treaty." 47 Although the dec-
laration does not define "appropriate compensation," it is clear from the
context that the term's content is not determined by a national-law standard.
B. BREACH OF CONTRACT
Subsection (2) of section 712 provides that a state is responsible under
international law for injury resulting from
a repudiation or breach by the state of a contract with a national of another
state
(a) where the repudiation or breach is (i) discriminatory; or (ii) motivated by
noncommercial considerations, and compensatory damages are not paid;
or
(b) where the foreign national is not given an adequate forum to determine
his claim of repudiation or breach, or is not compensated for any repu-
diation or breach determined to have occurred .... 48
1. Contract Breaches and International Law
Comment h of section 712 correctly states that, although a breaching
state party to a contract may be liable for the breach under applicable
national law, not every repudiation or breach by a state of a contract with
a foreign national constitutes a violation of international law. Beyond that
general statement, however, it is difficult to determine from the Revised
Restatement precisely when a contract breach will give rise to state re-
sponsibility. To some extent this was unavoidable; it is difficult to construct
44. Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Model Bilateral Agreements on Pro-
motion and Protection of Investments, 23 I.L.M. 237, 240-41, 261 (1984). The Committee
is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1956 as a result of the Bandung Conference,
where the Third World was born as a cohesive force. The committee has forty member
governments, including almost all the major states of Asia and Africa.
45. Seoul Declaration, supra note 32, 5.3.
46. Id. 5.5.
47. Id. 5.4.
48. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712(2).
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a rule that is at once precise and supported by the consensus needed to
establish a rule of international law.
The Revised Restatement provides that a state will be responsible for
a repudiation or breach, inter alia, if the breach "is akin to an expropri-
ation in that the contract is repudiated or breached for governmental rather
than commercial reasons and the state is not prepared to pay damages." 49
The text does not elaborate on the difference between a "governmental"
and a "commercial" reason for breach. The only further word of expla-
nation on the point appears in a Reporters' Note, which parenthetically
characterizes "governmental motives" as "akin to those that operate in
cases of expropriation." 50
Although the commercial-governmental distinction is well known in the
context of the law of sovereign immunity,51 the meaning of that distinction
cannot readily be incorporated into the law of injuries to aliens. The reason
is that, in the sovereign-immunity context, the commercial-governmental
distinction applies to the nature and not the purpose of the act in question.
If a government contracts to buy shoes from a private company in order
to dress its army for an attack upon a neighboring country, the nature of
the contract is commercial (to buy shoes) whereas the purpose is gov-
ernmental (to make war). Both the text and the legislative history of the
United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, for example, make it
clear that this nature-purpose distinction can be made and that the Act
intended to make it. 52
While the nature of an act can generally be discerned without great
difficulty, it is far more difficult to discern its purposes-requiring inquiry
into the motives of the actors, perhaps parsing mixed motives among
various agencies or officials within a government, and scrutiny of the
stated versus the unstated purposes of the act. Moreover, "governmental
49. Id. comment h.
50. Id. reporters' note 8.
51. See, e.g., the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)
(1982).
52. The term "commercial activity" is defined in the FSIA as "a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character
of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." Id. § 1603(d). The
meaning of the nature-purpose distinction was made clear in the House report on the
legislation:
As the definition indicates, the fact that goods or services to be procured through a
contract are to be used for a public purpose is irrelevant; it is the essentially commercial
nature ofan activity or transaction that is critical. Thus, a contract by a foreign government
to buy provisions or equipment for its armed forces or to construct a government building
constitutes a commercial activity. The same would be true of a contract to make repairs
on an embassy building. Such contracts should be considered to be commercial contracts,
even if their ultimate object is to further a public function.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976).
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motives" for breach of contract come in an infinite variety, including such
disparate factors as a shift in political regimes or policies within the ex-
propriating state, dissatisfaction with the performance of the private con-
tracting party, afterthoughts as to- whether a contract was truly
advantageous, or simple greed. Thus some state motives may sound in
politics, others in economics, still others in both. If a government breaches
a contract with a widget supplier because the minister of economy believes
the government's financial return would double if the state widget com-
pany expanded its own production, freeing needed funds to carry out a
national development plan, are the motives behind the expropriation gov-
ernmental or commercial? There is no obvious answer.
2. Internationalization of Contracts
Disagreement arose between the Reporters and some ALI members
over the extent to which international law governs contracts between
states and foreign nationals. The Reporters took a limited view of the
circumstances under which a state would incur international responsibility
for a breach of contract. They advanced a series of examples of contract
disputes, contending that issues of international law would rarely arise in
respect of a commercial contract for the delivery of goods or of a loan
between a state and a foreign lender.53 Some AL members objected to
the conclusions drawn from these examples. 54 One can speculate that no
suitable compromise was reached in this dispute, for in the end the Re-
porters did not alter their examples but merely moved them from the
comment to the Reporters' Notes, thus ceasing to claim ALI authority
for them. 55
The Reporters' Notes also fail to give full effect to the validity of
"internationalization" clauses, which provide that a contract "shall be
governed by 'general principles of the law of nations' or 'principles of the
law of [the state party] not inconsistent with international law" 56 or similar
formulations. In the Reporters' view, "[s]uch a clause does not ... render
the contract an international agreement subject to the rules of Part III,
or to international remedies." 57
The Reporters also note (without endorsing the view) that some de-
veloping countries have concluded that attempts to internationalize con-
53. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 reporters' note 10.
54. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 36. Compare REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 comment h (Tent. Draft
No. 3, Mar. 15, 1982) with REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712, reporters' note 10.
56. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 reporters' note 9.
57. Id. Part III of the Revised Restatement sets forth the rules covering the definition,
nature, and scope of international agreements, including the consequences of the termination
of such agreements.
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tracts are without effect, because they "derogat[e] from the state's
inalienable sovereignty, particularly its sovereign rights over its natural
resources." 58 The Reporters espouse "an intermediate view" between
the proponents and detractors of internationalization clauses, stating that
an internationalization clause "authorizes courts or arbitrators to develop
a body of rules for the resolution of disputes under such [internationalized]
contracts, either modeled after the rules governing international agree-
ments (Part III of this Restatement), or distilled from relevant general
principles of various national legal systems," 59 but does not render the
contract subject to international remedies.
Critics of the draft Restatement argued that, if a contract was expressly
or by clear intent governed by international law, international remedies
would indeed be available. Under this view, a state party to a contract is
free (in the exercise, indeed, of its "inalienable sovereignty") to select
international law as the governing law, and if its does, then breach of that
contract by the state would constitute a violation of international law that
would give rise to state responsibility. If, for example, two states had filed
declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) over all cases arising under international law, and if a contract
between one of these states and an alien of the other included a provision
that the contract was governed by international law, then why would the
ICJ not have compulsory jurisdiction over any suit arising from breach
of that contract? Surely an ICJ proceeding is an "international remedy."
The existence and practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
constitutes good evidence that breach of certain commercial contracts
can give rise to "international remedies." The Tribunal was created by
treaty, and is clearly an "international tribunal," as it has frequently
declared. 60 It applies (among other things) international law, even though
private claimants (except for "small claimants") appear before the tri-
bunal in their own right and claims are not "espoused" by the government
of the claimant. 61 Surely the remedy the Tribunal affords is an interna-
tional remedy.
As for the specific examples of breach of contract advanced by the
Reporters, 62 some ALl members maintained that issues of international
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. In Iran v. United States of America, Case No. A21, Decision No. 62-A21-FT, at 10
(May 4, 1987), the tribunal declared: "[T]his Tribunal is clearly an international tri-
bunal . . . . [I]t is the rights of the claimant, not of his nation, that are to be determined by
the Tribunal. This should be contrasted with the situation of espousal of claims in inter-
national law .... " (Emphasis in original.)
61. "Tribunal awards uniformally recognize that no espousal of claims by the United
States is involved in the cases before it." Id.
62. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 reporters' note 10.
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law would indeed arise in commercial contracts or foreign loans if the
contracts involved were governed by international law. International law
would also apply to the extent that an action, even if legal under domestic
law, violated the principles of international law. The Revised Restatement
accepts the latter point, stating that "[e]ven if the contract provides that
it shall be governed by local law, the contract is subject to the principles
of Subsection (2)" of section 712.63 This is consistent with the provision
in the Original Restatement that, if the governing law of a contract "de-
parts from the international standard of justice .... it governs only as
modified to comply with that standard." 64
The objections to the treatment of the internationalization of contracts
in Tentative Draft No. 3 were informed by the standards of international
responsibility for contract breach set forth in the Original Restatement.
The Original Restatement took a broader view as to what sorts of contract
breaches gave rise to international responsibility. It maintained that a
breach by a state of a contract with an alien could be wrongful either if
the state entered into the contract with the alien qua alien or if the cir-
cumstances indicated that, when the alien became a party to the contract,
the parties contemplated that contract performance would involve sub-
stantial foreign commerce, foreign resources, or activity outside the state's
territory. 65
These concepts were omitted from the Revised Restatement. The Orig-
inal Restatement's more expansive view of instances in which a breach
of contract entails state responsibility under international law can be de-
fended. It should at least have been recognized that a breach of contract
violates international law when the parties, either by explicit provision
or by clear evidence of intent, have made international law the governing
law of the contract.
3. Stabilization Clauses
Originally, the Reporters also looked askance at "stabilization" clauses,
which provide that the terms negotiated in a contract between a state and
a foreign national will not be unilaterally altered or repudiated by the state
through the promulgation of legislation or regulation that, if given effect,
would derogate from the terms of the contract. According to Tentative
Draft No. 3, "[s]uch clauses may be resisted, however, as an affront and
an alleged derogation from the state's sovereignty." 66 ALl members ex-
63. Id. reporters' note 9.
64. ORIGINAL RESTATEMENT § 194.
65. Id. § 193.
66. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 comment h (Tent. Draft No. 3, Mar. 15, 1982).
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pressed objection to this passage. They noted that many states had ac-
cepted such clauses. In any event, they argued, the proper question for
the Restatement was not speculation about the likelihood of obtaining
such clauses, but their legal effect where they exist. Where a state has
agreed to a stabilization clause, its violation should be recognized as ipso
facto an arbitrary breach or repudiation that incurs state responsibility
under subsection (2) of section 712.
In response to these criticisms, the Reporters somewhat softened the
statement concerning resistance to stabilization clauses, adding that "[i]f
coupled with an arbitration clause, such a stabilization clause will be given
effect by the arbitrator." 67 The Reporters also downgraded their discus-
sion of stabilization clauses from a Comment to a Reporter's Note.
4. Inability To Perform
Comment h of the Revised Restatement provides that a repudiation or
failure to perform is not a violation of international law under section 712
"if it is due to the state's inability to perform." The meaning of "inability
to perform" in this context is highly unclear. True inability to perform
on the part of the state would amount to force majeure or frustration,
and the state would normally be excused from performance without this
peculiar rule, for which no authority exists.
The troubling implication of Comment h is that the Reporters seem to
go further in excusing nonperformance on the part of the state. For ex-
ample, the Reporters indicate that inability to perform includes an inability
to pay.68 Inability to pay, however, can never excuse performance; 69 if it
could, the law of bankruptcy would not exist. In addition, it is difficult
to imagine a situation in which a state is genuinely unable to pay a contract
debt; the real situation will be that it is unwilling to pay because it prefers
to make some other use of its money.70
67. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 reporters' note 10.
68. Id. § 712 reporters' note 8.
69. Failure to pay money as required by contract is explicitly excepted from force majeure
and similar doctrines in, e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, The Federal Republic
of Germany, Switzerland, and Iran. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1932, at 10-11 (3d ed.
1979); RESTATEMENT (ORIGINAL) OF CONTRACTS § 261 and comment a, illustration 2 (1932);
Parradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647), Aleyn 26; Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareban
U.D.C., [1956] A.C. 696; GERMAN CIVIL CODE § 279; Linder, Law of Contracts, in BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY 73 (B. Ruester ed. 1983); Gauch/Schluep/Jaeggi, Schweizer-
isches Obligationenrecht, N 1858; Khadjavi-Gontard & Hausmann, Gruendzoge des iran-
ischen Vertragsrechts tnter besonderer Beruecksichtigung des Rechts der Leistungsstorungen,
RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 675, 679 (Oct. 1979).
70. Under comment h of Section 712, whether such a breach would give rise to state
responsibility could depend on whether the breach results from commercial or governmental
motives. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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5. 'Arbitrary" Breach or Repudiation
While the Original Restatement provided for state responsibility for
"arbitrary" repudiation of contracts, the Reporters to the Revised Re-
statement question the use of the term "arbitrary" in this context, im-
plying that the term is ambiguous and perhaps superfluous. 71 The Reporters
suggest that it is unclear whether a breach would be deemed "arbitrary"
in any instances other than those that violate other provisions of section
712. The Reporters note that "some commentators" consider "unrea-
sonable departure from principles recognized by the main legal systems
of the world in their law of government contracts" to be arbitrary.72 Even
here the Reporters hedge by noting that "the propriety of governmental
action affecting rights under state contracts has been uncertain under
national law, too." 73 All in all, the treatment of arbitrary breach or re-
pudiation in the Revised Restatement is distinctly unsatisfactory. 74
C. DISCRIMINATORY ACTS
Subsection (3) of section 712 provides that "other arbitrary or discrim-
inatory acts or omissions by the state that impair property or other eco-
nomic interests of a national of another state" shall give rise to state
responsibility under international law. The term "discriminatory" has
suffered a different fate from the term "arbitrary" in the Revised Re-
statement. While it is clearer what the term means-acts that single out
aliens generally, or aliens of a particular nationality, or particular aliens75 -
it is less clear what import an act so characterized will have, according
to the Revised Restatement, under international law. In the context of
takings, for instance, the Revised Restatement suggests that a taking that
was discriminatory but did provide just compensation "might not.., be
successfully challenged" under international law. 76
This allegedly dubious status of discrimination as an independent ground
to challenge a taking in the presence ofjust compensation is not explained
by any weakening of the legal and normative objections to discrimination,
71. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 reporters' note 8.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. The Reporters are less equivocal in defining "arbitrary" in the context of discrimi-
natory acts. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712(3). In Reporters' Note II, while stating that the
term "arbitrary" is used in § 712(3) in an analogous sense to its use in connection with
§ 712(2) (contract repudiation), the Reporters added that "[i]t refers to an act that is unfair
and unreasonable and inflicts serious injury to established rights of foreign nationals, though
falling short of an act that would constitute an expropriation under Reporters' Note No.
6."
75. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 commentf
76. Id.
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but only as a reflection of its alleged redundance with other terms and
the possible difficulty in determining that discrimination exists "where
there is no comparable enterprise owned by local nationals or by nationals
of other countries, or where nationals of the taking state are treated equally
with aliens but by discrete actions separated in time." 77 It is regrettable
that the Revised Restatement should so casually impugn the importance
of discrimination, a well-established ground for finding that a taking was
wrongful under international law.
D. PROPERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT
One additional matter concerning property rights, treated in neither the
Original nor the Revised Restatement, deserves comment. Some ALT
members favored protecting the property rights not only of aliens (as in
section 712) but also of nationals of the expropriating state. No such
provision appeared in the Original Restatement, which did not include a
provision on international human rights.
The issue Was debated at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the ALI, where
a motion was made to include property rights in the black letter of section
702, which lists those human rights that are protected under customary
international law.78 This motion was based on the view expressed in a
comment to section 711 of the Revised Restatement, 79 which cited the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that the right
to own property is a human right and that no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property. 80 Professor Henkin replied that the reference
in section 711 to property as a human right applies only to state respon-
sibility for injuries to aliens, while section 702 deals with state respon-
sibility for injuries to its own nationals. 8' Property as a human right,
Professor Henkin maintained, had attained the status of customary law
only in respect to a state's treatment of aliens, not of its own nationals.
The motion did not carry.
Recently the European Court of Human Rights considered this question
in Case of Lithgow and Others. 82 In that case, British nationals com-
plained that the United Kingdom had nationalized their property on the
payment of compensation that was less than just. Their argument was
that the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act of 1977 violated the
77. Id.
78. ALl PROC., supra note 15, at 216-21.
79. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 711 comment d. This language appeared as comment c to
§ 711 in earlier drafts of the Restatement.
80. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217A. U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
81. ALI PROC., supra note 15, at 216-17.
82. 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), discussed in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 425-27 (1987).
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European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 83
The Court held that general principles of international law do not apply
to the expropriation by a nation of the property of its nationals, 84 even
though Protocol I to the Convention provides that -[n]o one shall be
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of inter-
national law." 85 Drawing heavily on the travaux prparatories of the Con-
vention, the Court held that Protocol I does create expropriation-
compensation rights in nationals against their own governments, but
imposes a lesser and more discretionary standard than that embodied in
the international law of responsibility for injuries to aliens. 86
While cases such as Lithgow make it clear that international law has
not progressed to the point where it accords nationals all the same rights
as aliens, there is undeniably a growing trend in international and multi-
lateral agreements to accord certain rights under international law to na-
tionals against their own state. As long ago as 1948, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (though not legally binding) asserted that
"everyone" has the right "to own property alone as well as in association
with others" and provided that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his property." 87 No explicit provision was included in the Universal Dec-
laration, however, that required just compensation to be paid for a taking.
Subsequent regional measures have moved further in that direction. In
addition to Protocol I to the 1953 European Convention of Human Rights
(ratified by twenty states), discussed above, the 1969 American Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ratified by thirteen states) provides in article 21:
"No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just
compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the
cases and according to the forms established by law." 88 The African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights (not yet in force) would "guarantee" the
right to property, although it makes no explicit mention of compensation. 89
83. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 14, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
84. Lithgow, supra note 82, at 425.
85. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, supra note 83, protocol I, art. I, I.
86. Cf. Sporrong & Loengroth, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 68 I.L.R. 86 (1982), where the
European Court of Human Rights held the government of Sweden liable in damages to two
Swedish nationals under article I of protocol I to the European Convention.
87. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 80, art. 17.
88. American Convention of Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, Off. Rec.
OEA/Sec. L/V/lI.23, doc. 21, art. 21.
89. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) art. 14, reprinted in COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS:
COMPLETION OP DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS 155 (1983).
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While it cannot be said that these measures have created a new rule of
general international law, the trend is salutary and worthy of encourage-
ment. To the extent that any rights are enjoyed by nationals as human
rights under international law, the right to be protected in one's property
from economic injury ought to be one of them. Twentieth-century history
surely confirms the common-sense observation that, if a person can be
deprived without compensation of the right to own property, whatever
other "rights" the law may purport to grant him are academic and illusory.
International declarations, regional conventions, and customary inter-
national law have gone a substantial distance towards recognizing that
the right to property is a human right. To give that right meaning, it should
be complemented by recognition of the right to be justly compensated for
takings of property.
While the Revised Restatement takes a forward-looking view with re-
spect to the recognition of many other human rights under international
law,90 it falls silent when it comes to recognizing, at least de legeferenda,
such a right in respect to property. This missed opportunity is to be
regretted, although the reference to property rights as a human right in
the comment to Section 711 represents a very small step in the right
direction.
IV. International Wrongs and State Responsibility
The Revised Restatement differs somewhat from the Original Restate-
ment in its characterization of economic injuries to aliens. The Original
Restatement characterized state conduct that caused injury to economic
interests of an alien as "wrongful" under international law.
Section 711 of the Revised Restatement provides that "[a] state is
responsible under international law for injury to a national of another state
caused by an official act or omission that violates ... (c) a right to property
or another economic interest that, under international laws, is obligated
to respect for persons, natural or juridical, of foreign nationality that are
protected by international law, as provided in Section 712."91 The Intro-
ductory Note to Part VII of the Revised Restatement states that the rule
of "responsibility" for injury to aliens "was established early as a norm
of customary international law." Although "responsibility" is not explic-
90. According to § 702 of the Revised Restatement, the customary international law of
human rights offers protection against genocide, slavery, and the slave trade; murder and
forced disappearance; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment; prolonged arbitrary protection; systematic racial discrimination; and consistent pat-
terns of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.
91. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 711.
SPRING 1988
60 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
itly defined, the context demonstrates that the term refers to an obligation
under international law to make reparation for an injury.92
It seems clear, from the words "injury" in section 711 and the Intro-
ductory Note and "violates" in section 711, that under the Revised Re-
statement a state acts wrongfully whenever it incurs state responsibility.
This conclusion is further confirmed by Comment d to section 712, which
states that, in "exceptional circumstances," some deviation from the tra-
ditional standard of just compensation might be permitted, while adding
a list of circumstances that would not be "exceptional." This "exceptions
to exceptions" passage is otherwise analyzed above. 93 It remains to be
noted that the last exception to the exception provides that a deviation
from the traditional standard of just compensation is unwarranted if "the
taking itself was otherwise wrongful" under subsection (1)(a) or (b) of
section 712.94 Those provisions do not use the word "wrongful," but
provide that a state is "responsible" under international law for injury
resulting from a taking that is "not for a public purpose" or "discrimi-
natory." Thus it is adequately clear that the more neutral term "respon-
sible" in the Revised Restatement has the same meaning as the more
judgmental term "wrongful" in the Original Restatement. Presumably it
was also intended to have the same consequences, though it would have
been desirable to say so explicitly.
What are those consequences? First, under sound (though not undis-
puted) principles, whether a taking is wrongful or not determines whether
or not the taking effectively passes title to the expropriating state under
international law and under domestic legal systems that incorporate in-
ternational law.95 This issue has been extensively litigated in such cases
as The Rose Mary.96 In that case, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company claimed
title to oil sold by the Government of Iran to the defendants. The latter
argued, inter alia, that the company did not own the cargo of oil because
it had been expropriated pursuant to the law of Iran. The court held that
92. The Introductory Note to Part VII of the Revised Restatement states that "respon-
sibility for injury to aliens" by a state "in legal principle has been seen as an offense to the
state of his nationality." These references to "injury" and "offense," which would give rise
to a "remedy for the violation," make it clear that "state responsibility" for injury to an
alien entails the necessity of compensation for the injury.
93. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
94. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 comment d.
95. This principle, of course, underlies the references in the United States Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act to cases "in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue," 28 U.S. C. § 1605(p)(3) (1982), and in the Hickenlooper/Sabbatino amend-
ment to cases "in which a claim of title or other rights to property is asserted by any party
• ..based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking ...in violation of the
principles of international law. ... 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1992)).
96. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. v. Jaffrate and Others (The Rose Mary), 20 I.L.R. 316
(Aden Sup. Ct. 1953).
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the company's title had not been extinguished, because of the failure of
the Government of Iran to provide for any compensation to the company
under the Oil Nationalization Law or any other measure. For that reason,
the court held the nationalization law to be contrary to international law
and ineffective to pass title. In concluding that the disputed oil remained
the property of the company, the court determined that an expropriation
that was wrongful under international law could not give rise to the passage
of title to the oil from the former owner to the expropriating state. The
same result should follow notwithstanding the Revised Restatement's tact-
ful substitution of "responsibility" for "wrongfulness" as the touchstone
of state liability.
The second consequence of wrongfulness relates to the standard of
compensation for economic injuries. Under the doctrine established in
the Chorz6w Factory case, the proper measure of compensation for a
lawful taking is "the value of the undertaking at the moment of dispos-
session, plus interest to the day of payment." 97 But, if an expropriation
is unlawful (wrongful), then "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe
out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed." 98 The remedy for a wrongful taking should be restitution,
or if that is impossible, the amount in money that has a value equivalent
to restitution.
The distinction is of practical significance in a situation in which the
value of a property appreciates after the taking. If the taking was wrongful,
in order to wipe out the consequences of the wrongful act while providing
restitution to the former property owner, the expropriating party must be
denied-and the former owner granted-the benefits of that appreciation.
In practical terms, this requires the compensation to the former owner to
be based upon the value of the property as of the date the arbitral award
is issued. If the taking was not wrongful, by contrast, the former owner
is entitled to compensation based upon the value of the property as of
the date of the taking plus interest to the date of payment. 99
When is a taking wrongful under international law? The Original Re-
statement listed several grounds for finding it so: (1) the taking is not
authorized by the domestic law of the expropriating state; 100 (2) provision
97. 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A.) No. 17, at 47; 1 WORLD COURT REPORTS 646, 677 (M. Hudson
ed. 1934). A taking which is unlawful is perforce wrongful.
98. 1 WORLD CoUwT REPORTS, supra note 97, at 677-78.
99. For recent discussions in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal of the lawful-unlawful
distinction and its implications for the measure of compensation, see Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp.
v. Iran, Award No. 310-56-3, and Concurring Opinion of Judge Brower (July 14, 1987).
100. The negative implication of the references in the Original Restatement to property
takings that are carried out pursuant to domestic law and are not wrongful under international
law is that a taking of foreign-owned property carried out in violation of domestic law would
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for the calculation and payment of just compensation is not made at or
prior to the time of expropriation;10' (3) the taking is discriminatory; 10 2
(4) the taking is carried out in breach of contract; 10 3 (5) the taking is not
for a public purpose; 1° 4 (6) the taking violates an international agree-
ment; 10 5 (7) the taking violates the international standard of justice. 106 It
was recognized that the failure to pay just compensation before or at the
time of the taking is not of itself wrongful, but that the failure to pay at
all is wrongful regardless of whether the taking itself was wrongful. 0 7
Thus, in order not to be wrongful, a taking must be accompanied by a
bona fide effort to make adequate provision (including the establishment
of fair procedures) for payment of just compensation meeting the inter-
national standard.
As we have seen, the Revised Restatement is generally consistent with
the Original Restatement in invoking state responsibility for those injuries
that the Original Restatement calls wrongful, except that the Revised
Restatement omits any reference to takings not authorized by domestic
law and treats both the rule against discrimination and the effectiveness
of stabilization clauses in contracts somewhat grudgingly. It would have
been preferable, also, had the Revised Restatement discussed the con-
sequences of a taking for which a state is internationally "responsible"
with respect to passage of title and standard of compensation. 0 8
be wrongful under international law. See ORIGINAL RESTATEMENT § 185 comment b, illus-
tration I; see also INA Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 184-161-1, Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 7-8; Aug. 13,
1985); Seidl-Hohenveldern, Communist Theories of Confiscation and Expropriation: Critical
Comments, 7 AM. J. COMp. L. 541, 549 (1958).
101. ORIGINAL RESTATEMENT § 185(b).
102. Id. § 185 comment a; § 166.
103. Id. § 193 and comment e.
104. Id. § 185(a).
105. Id. § 165.
106. Id.
107. Id. § 185 comment c; § 186.
108. This being said, it is fair to note that the Original Restatement, while it was quite
clear that the wrongfulness of a taking had consequences for the standard of compensation,
was profoundly unsophisticated in attempting to articulate those consequences. See ORIG-
INAL RESTATEMENT § 193 comment e, illustration I, which refers to compensation for a
lawful taking as "based on the fair market value of the properties but providing no com-
pensation for loss of future earnings." This makes no economic sense whatever; see infra
notes 116-19 and accompanying text. As to passage of title, the position of the Original
Restatement appeared to be that each state in which expropriated property was found had
discretion to "treat a taking in violation of international law as ineffective in passing title."
ORIGINAL RESTATEMENT § 185 comment c.
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V. The Measure of Compensation
In order to be just, compensation must make the expropriated alien
whole for the value he has lost. 109 The proper measure of compensation,
then, must be at least the full, fair-market value of the property that was
taken. I 1 0 While the Revised Restatement acknowledges this principle, I I I
it at times becomes vague and confusing when addressing the mechanics
of how property is valued. 112 For businessmen and economists there is
no mystery; the value of income-producing property is equivalent to the
present value of the property's future income. 113 This value is known as
"going concern" value, and if calculated correctly, by what is known as
discounted-cash-flow analysis, is identical to fair market value.
A. THE RESTATEMENT AND GOING-CONCERN VALUE
The Restatement recognizes that just compensation requires restoration
to the owner of the full value of his expropriated property, but indicates
substantial confusion as to how that is done. The Reporters cite two
United States Supreme Court decisions in which the owners, respectively,
of a tugboat and of 760,000 tons of pepper were denied full market value
as compensation for their property, which was requisitioned during World
War II. 114 Their use of these cases to cast doubt on the market-value
standard is unpersuasive. The cited dicta from United States v. Cors
denied that "just compensation" can be reduced to a "formula," and
maintained that the Fifth Amendment contains no "definite standards of
fairness" to measure just compensation.'l 5 The Court in Cors merely
109. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Whether the injured alien is entitled to
the full value of the property at the date award depends upon whether or not the taking
was wrongful. Id.
110. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
Ill. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 comment d.
112. Id. reporters' note 3.
113. See, e.g., A. BENDER & P-A. DUMONT, L'ANALYSE ET LE CHOIX DES INVESTISSE-
MENTS (1976); R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1984); I.
FISHER, THEORY OF INTEREST (1930); M. GORDON, THE INVESTMENT, FINANCING & VAL-
UATION OF THE CORPORATION (1962); F. & V. LUTZ, THEORY OF INVESTMENT OF THE FIRM
(1951); B. SOLNIK, GESTION FINANCItRE (1980); E. SOLOMON, THE MANAGEMENT OF COR-
PORATE CAPITAL (1959); K. WICKSELL, LECTURES ON POLITICAL ECONOMY (1901. Engl.
tr. 1934); J. WILLIAMS, THEORY OF INVESTMENT VALUE (1938); G. WOEHLE, EINFUENRUNG
IM DIE ALLGEMEINE BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTSLEHRE (11th ed. 1975); Modigliani & Miller.
The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON.
REV. 261 (1958); Samuelson, Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Capital, 51 Q.J. ECON.
469 (1937).
114. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950); United States v.
Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949).
115. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 reporters' note 3.
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held, however, that enhancement of value of the requisitioned tug resulting
from the U.S. Government's requisitioning program itself had to be ex-
cluded from the compensable value owing the respondent. This holding
is entirely consistent with the well-established principle that the valuation
of an expropriated asset for purposes of determining just compensation
ought not include alterations in value-either upward or downward-
caused by acts by the expropriating authority that are related to the
taking. 116
The Reporters then cite dicta in a 1950 Supreme Court opinion, United
States v. Commodities Trading Corp.: "[W]hen market value has been
too difficult to find, or when its application would result in manifest in-
justice to owner or public, courts have fashioned and applied other stan-
dards."'' 7 These dicta appeared in the context of the Court's rejection
of a peacetime market-value standard in favor of the application of a
wartime price ceiling pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act. The
Reporters neglect to note that the Court also observed that "[i]n peace-
time when prices are not fixed, the normal measure of just compensation
has been current market value" and "[t]he general rule has been that the
government pays current market value for property taken, the price which
could be obtained in a negotiated sale, whether the property had cost the
owner more or less than that price." ' 8 The use of these unrepresentative
dicta gives an unfortunate, and wholly inaccurate, impression of vague-
ness or uncertainty about the market-value or going-concern method of
valuing assets.
This ambiguity is unnecessary. Where an efficient market exists for
identical assets (such as publicly traded shares of stock of the same entity),
the value established by that market-that is, the market price on the
valuation date-will normally be determinative of going-concern value.
Similarly, when there have been recent sales of comparable assets, the
prices obtained in these sales may be used to calculate the going-concern
value of the expropriated property. In essence, in such cases the buyers
and sellers of the free market have performed an impartial discounted-
cash-flow analysis already; the value agreed between buyer and seller
reflects the market's determination of the property's going-concern value.
Where market values cannot so easily be determined (e.g., because the
asset is unique or there are insufficient data from comparable sales), going-
concern value is best established through the use of discounted-cash-flow
analysis. At any given time, the value of an income-producing asset will
depend upon the net cash flows it is expected to generate in the future,
116. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
117. 339 U.S. at 123.
118. Id. at 126, 130.
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"discounted" (reduced) to a "present value" (value as of the valuation
date) at a percentage rate that fully accounts both for the time value of
money and for all relevant risks. Because the value of an asset does not
depend upon historical factors such as cost or past usefulness, measures
of value that look backward-such as book value and capitalization of
historic income-are inappropriate and inadequate in a determination of
the just compensation required by international law for an ongoing business.
While acknowledging the general validity of the use of discounted-cash-
flow analysis to calculate going-concern value, the Restatement under-
states the importance of such analysis. Comment d to section 712 states
that the determination of fair market value should "take into account
'going concern value,' if any, and other generally recognized principles
of valuation." This comment suggests that going-concern value might be
but one of many elements in fair market value. As noted above, however,
for ongoing businesses going-concern value is fair market value.
The Reporters also downplay the importance of discounted-cash-flow
analysis when they describe it, in Reporters' Note 3 to section 712, as
"[a]nother method of valuation that would also capture going concern
value." In the academic and business worlds today, discounted-cash-flow
analysis is recognized almost without dissent as the only sound way to
value a going concern, in the absence of an efficient market or comparable
sales for assets very similar to that which has been expropriated. Courts
have been slower to follow, but they are catching up.119
119. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983) (discounted-
cash-flow (DCF) analysis applied to determine damages awarded to compensate injured
employee); In re Valuation Proceedings, 531 F. Supp. 1191, 1225-36 (Regional Rail Reorg.
Ct. 1981) (per curiam) (DCF method superior to the method of capitalizing earnings for an
average year); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,375 (S.D.
Ohio Dec. 7, 1981) (approving evidence submitted to support a board of directors' valuation
of an interest in an oil field based on a DCF analysis); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Watt, 517 F.
Supp. 1209, 1213 (D.D.C. 1981) (concluding that a method for determining the "fair market
value" for offshore oil and gas tracts that employed a computer-model simulation of pro-
duction and projections of discounted cash flow was "a careful [and] conscientious system"
of valuation); Northern Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 43,261, at 3438-40
(Aug. II, 1986) (applying DCF method in an estate-and-gift-tax valuation of an ongoing
business). In Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia (Award on the Merits) (Goldman,
Foighel, Rubin, Arbs. 1984) (Amco Asia), excerpted in 24 I.L.M. 1022, 1034 (1985), annulled
in part on other grounds, Decision of the ad hoc Committee (Seidl-Hohenveldern, Feliciano,
Giardina, Members 1986), 12 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 129 (1987), the claimant sought full going-
concern value as of the date of taking, without any inquiry into whether that value had
increased by the date of the award.
The Amco Asia award held the following with respect to compensation: (1) international
law requires full compensation for expropriation of a foreign investor's property and breach
and repudiation of its contract rights; (2) the investor's expectation of future income is a
necessary element of full compensation; and (3) in the case of a going concern, or of contract
rights that have value because of an expectation of future income, the present value of the
property rights should be determined by means of a DCF calculation. The ad hoc committee
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B. Loss OF VALUE AS A RESULT OF
ACTS OR THREATS BY THE STATE
It is a well-established rule of customary international law that the
compensable value of an expropriated enterprise or broken contract can-
not be diminished by governmental conduct that leads to fear of expro-
priation or breach of contract or is otherwise designed to reduce the value
of the target property. As stated in the Draft Convention on the Protection
of Foreign Property, the value of expropriated property "must remain
unaffected by artificial factors such as deterioration due to the prospect
of the very seizure which ultimately occurs, similar seizures by that Party
concerned or the general conduct of the Party towards property of aliens
which makes such seizures likely."'120 Such conduct includes threats of
taking, takings of other property that create fear of taking, breaches of
contract and similar actions.
On the other hand, where the diminution in value results not from the
conduct of the expropriating state toward alien property but rather from
general, lawful economic policies of the state or other economic traumas,
the claimant is not entitled to compensation for the loss of value so oc-
casioned. I- Sola Tiles, for example, the Iran-United States Claims Tri-
bunal found that the expropriated company's trade "consisted largely of
selling specialized luxury tiles, the market for which depended in large
measure on the continued construction of luxury houses and apart-
that partially annulled the award in no way challenged the methodology that the arbitral
tribunal had used to calculate the amount of damages owed.
In its partial award in Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, supra note 99, a majority of Chamber
3 of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal rejected the DCF method for two reasons: it
found the method too speculative on the facts of the case, and it advanced a novel inter-
pretation of the Chorz6w Factory case, suopra note 97, as holding that compensation for a
lawful taking, while including an element for future "prospects" of a business, could not
be based on future "profits," even when discounted. Appreciation of the practical conse-
quences of this distinction must await a final award in the case. In contrast, Chamber I of
the Tribunal accepted and applied the DCF method without hesitation or difficulty in Starrett
Housing Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 314-24-1 (Aug. 14, 1987). Both chambers emphatically
rejected book value, the method advocated by Iran.
120. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Publication No. 23081
(1967), art. 3, comment 9(a), 7 I.L.M. 117, 127 (1968); see also Chorz6w Factory case, I
WORLD COURT REPORTS, supra note 97, at 680; accord Administrative Decision No. VII
(the Vinland case) of the Mixed Claims Commission (United States-Germany), 7 R.I.A.A.
203, 242 n. 19 (1925) (reasonable market value governs even if the market "may have been
either depressed or inflated by abnormal conditions howsoever produced"); ORIGINAL RE-
STATEMENT § 188 comment b: "So far as practicable, full value must be determined as of
the time of taking, unaffected by the taking, by other related takings, or by conduct attrib-
utable to the taking state and having the effect of depressing the value of the property in
anticipation of the taking." Accord ITT Industries, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 47-156-2 (May 26,
1983) (sep. op. Aldrich at 12), 2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 345, 348, 355; American Int'l Group, Inc.
v. Iran, supra note 17, 4 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. at 106-07.
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ments."1 2 1 Given the certainty that the market for such luxury items
"would have suffered a severe diminution as a result of the sweeping
social changes brought about by the Islamic Revolution," the Tribunal
declined to award the expropriated party compensation based on the value
of alleged future profits. 122
The only reference to these principles in the Revised Restatement can
be found in the Reporters' Notes:
A revolutionary situation giving rise to the taking which might affect the pros-
pects of the enterprise in the eyes of a hypothetical purchaser, though it does
not itself involve a taking in violation of international law oran act in anticipation
of the taking, should be taken into account in valuation. 123
This statement is correct, but deals with only one side of the coin. It
acknowledges only by implication that there can be consequences of a
revolution (or other governmental acts) that do not reduce the compensa-
ble value of property and must be excluded from consideration. 124 It is
regrettable that the Reporters did not choose to make an affirmative state-
ment of that rule, but rather included only the counterexample of cases
in which reductions in value should be taken into account in calculating
just compensation.
C. PARTIAL COMPENSATION
"Lump sum" or other settlements for less than the full going-concern
value of an expropriated enterprise have sometimes been agreed to by
the owners or the owners' state. Some have argued that these settlements
evidence a rule of law that less-than-full compensation is acceptable under
some circumstances.
Fortunately the Revised Restatement, in its final version, does not
accept this view. While earlier drafts were noncommittal on the weight
to be accorded settlements, the Reporters' Notes now correctly state that
they "do not provide persuasive evidence as to what the parties to the
settlement believed the relevant law to be." 125 While noting that "it has
been argued" that lump-sum settlements "suggest that only modest com-
pensation need be paid" under international law, 126 the Reporters cite
with approval the cogent statement of the International Court of Justice
121. Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran, supra note 17, at 24; accord American Int'l Group, Inc. v.
Iran, supra note 17.
122. Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran, supra note 17 at 24.
123. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 reporters' note 3.
124. See American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran, supra note 17; Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran, supra
note 17.
125. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 712 reporters' note 1.
126. Id.
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that "such settlements 'are sui generis and provide no guide' as to general
international practice."' 27
VI. Conclusion
Over the past generation, the international law relating to economic
injury to aliens has at times been questioned, and indeed seriously chal-
lenged. However, the traditional rule that the injured party must be af-
forded compensation that is prompt, adequate and effective has been
reinforced through state practice and a large and growing body of inter-
national arbitral awards. The continued vitality of that standard reflects
both its simple justice and its commercial utility in establishing the clear
expectations that are necessary to induce foreign investment and the
economic benefits that it brings to developed and developing nations alike.
At the end of the day, the Revised Restatement has reaffirmed that prin-
ciple. While section 712 is flawed in several significant respects, its basic
thrust is sound.
127. Id. (quoting Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), [1970]
I.C.J. 3, 40). The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal agrees. In SEDCO, Inc. v. NIOC,
Award No. ITL 59-129-3, at 8 (Mar. 27, 1986), the tribunal declared that lump-sum agree-
ments between states and compensation settlements between states and foreign companies:
can be so greatly inspired by non-judicial considerations-e.g., resumption of diplomatic
or trading relations-that it is extremely difficult to draw from them conclusions as to
opiniojuris, i.e., the determination that the content of such settlements was thought by
the States involved to be required by international law. The International Court of Justice
and international arbitral tribunals have cast serious doubts on the value of such settle-
ments as evidence of custom.
Accord Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 433 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd sub nom. First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba,
462 U.S. 611 (1983).
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